Abstract-This paper discusses microgrid power supply resiliency in extreme events and the impact of power electronic interfaces, energy storage, lifelines, and the characteristics of distribution architectures. Resiliency is characterized based on metrics analogous to those of availability considering the presence of power electronic interfaces and energy storage. The effect of energy storage on microgrid resiliency is analyzed and resiliency improvement in the presence of diverse sources is discussed. Resiliency metrics, which are time dependent in nature, are derived under natural disasters conditions. Resiliency is calculated for microgrids containing photovoltaics with batteries, diesel generators, and fuel storage with discontinuous fuel supply. Hurricane conditions are considered to provide a practical context for the discussion. Microgrid resiliency formulas are derived for radial, ring, and ladder architectures. It is shown that the resiliency formula for radial architecture can be used as a building block to derive the formulas for the ring and ladder networks. Architecture resiliencies are compared in islanded and grid-tie modes. The results indicate that the effects of including energy storage and source diversity, such as combinations of renewable energy sources and diesel generators, can improve power supply resiliency when the microgrid is in island mode, which is the most likely operating mode during extreme events.
and Telephone Corporation Facilities in Sendai, during the Great Tohoku earthquake and tsunami on March 11, 2011 in Japan [4] , [5] , and a microgrid in Garden City, New York, during hurricanes Irene and Sandy [6] . Microgrids, however, themselves may not be resilient if they are not well designed [1] , [7] , [8] because many distributed energy resources (DERs) used to power the microgrid may be dependent on other infrastructures called lifelines [1] , [9] . Examples of lifeline dependence are diesel generators dependent on roads and other transportation infrastructure to have their fuel delivered or natural gas microturbines dependent on natural gas distribution infrastructure. Although renewable energy sources are not typically dependent on lifelines, they are subject to natural phenomena. However, these issues with microgrids DERs may be mitigated with the use of power sources of diverse technologies [7] . In addition, local energy storage allows one to manage lifeline dependencies and improve resiliency [1] , [7] , [10] . Energy storage options for diesel generators include fuel in tanks and sometimes inertial storage-like flywheels [11] . For renewable energy sources, storage options include batteries [10] and ultracapacitors [12] . Microgrids form the backbone of many smart grid technologies, which are expected to effectively improve energy resiliency and security. However, in order to achieve the desired performance level, it is critical to understand the various uncertainties involved in their planning, design and operation [13] . In addition, the effect of power electronic interfaces as essential system components also needs to be understood and considered. These power electronic circuits are used in microgrids to connect the various distributed resources to the loads via the distribution network and, thus, influence resiliency metrics.
Due to the analogies between up and down times and the notions of withstanding capabilities and quick recovery in Presidential Policy Directive 21, it has been proposed to measure resiliency using metrics analogous to those of availability [14] . If T U and T D are the up and down times over the evaluated period, respectively, the resiliency can be measured based on
This metric for resiliency is analogous to the concept of availability. However, availability is calculated after many cycles of failure and repairs, whereas resiliency can be calculated for one or many disaster cycles. Every cycle of a natural disaster can be divided into various phases. A pictorial representation is shown in Fig. 1 . The first phase spans the time when the disaster is acting and failures are occurring. In subsequent phases, the focus is on repair or restoration activities, which are influenced various logistics processes. In order to apply (1) to a system with storage/buffers regulating lifeline dependencies, [14] further extends the definition of resiliency when the system includes buffers with an autonomy time T S as
In the above equation, R base is the availability calculated without the storage/buffer and μ is the inverse of the down time associated to the base resiliency. Equations (1) and (2) are general and can be applied to any system. This paper uses this availability analogy as a basic paradigm to evaluate microgrid resiliency in extreme events. Although the primary motivation for this paper is extreme events, the models described in this paper can be extended to normal operating conditions with the appropriate data for each application by considering the models in steady state. As such, the proposed analysis can also be used to evaluate the effect of "changing conditions" indicated in the aforementioned resiliency definition from [3] , such as the effects of climate change, on microgrid resiliency. For example, demand changes and their effect on resiliency can be evaluated-even considering various power distribution approaches and the use of power electronic interfaces placed in key nodes of the microgrid in order to create a modular open microgrid architecture as detailed in [15] -using the analytical tools described in this paper. Hence, operational changes, such as load changes, are considered to be part of normal conditions for a microgrid and, thus, out of the scope of this paper.
In this paper, a clear distinction is made in the used of terms, reliability, availability, and resiliency. Although resiliency and its metric is a relatively novel concept that is explored in this paper, reliability and availability are well established concepts with strict definitions that are provided in many past publications, such as in [16] . Based on these past works, reliability is defined for a component. Specifically, reliability is the probability that a component will continuously work for a specified amount of time. When a component's model (transition from working to failed state) is considered, it is the probability that the sojourn time in the working state is a particular value, i.e., Pr(T f > T ), where T f is the failure time and T is the specification. In contrast, availability is the steadystate probability of finding a system in the working state, and after this, the system undergoes failures and repairs for an infinite number of cycles. It is equivalent to the fraction of the time spent in the working state in the steady state. Hence, based on (1), resiliency is an analogous but not equivalent to the concept of availability. In (1), T U can be associated with the withstanding capability of a system to a disruptive event and T D can be related to the restoration speed during such a disruptive event. Since a single event is considered, the calculation of resiliency does not require considering a steady-state behavior after an infinite number of failure and repair cycles as it happens with the calculation of availability.
The interplay between the diverse sources and storage makes resiliency (availability) calculations a generally complicated problem. A number of approaches in terms of evaluating the microgrids' impact on various systems such as buildings and cyber-physical systems have been studied [17] [18] [19] , but quantifying the availability in the presence of storage and diverse sources has been studied less. References [20] and [21] studied microgrid performance with photovoltaic (PV) modules and wind generators in order to characterize diverse and intermittent sources. Song et al. [10] , Bahramirad et al. [22] , and Kakimoto et al. [23] presented methods for finding the optimal storage sizing for the given availability constraints for microgrids with renewable energy sources. However, the methods applied are limited to a specific type of source, for example, PV sources, and therefore lack diversity. The effect of combined heat and power integration into microgrids has been studied in [24] and the integration of a highly available power distribution system has been studied in [25] . Energy storage plays an important role in improving power supply resiliency. In evaluating the capability of energy storage to supply energy, Markov-chain-based techniques are becoming popular in modeling the evolution of battery state of charge. Such techniques have been employed in particular when considering renewable energy sources [10] , [26] . However, any resilient design would be incomplete without considering the power distribution portion. Part of the power distribution grid design includes considering power electronic interfaces because their use is essential for the integration of the various DERs to the loads in a given microgrid distribution architecture. The role of microgrid interfaces ranges from equipment protection to controlling the power flow. Various methods for selecting optimal configurations for smart microgrids have been studied in [27] [28] [29] , but these studies do not consider failures in the microgrid and infrastructure interdependencies. Moreover, although most of these past works attempt to consider the resiliency characteristics of microgrids, quantitative metrics for resiliency in order to effectively consider these characteristics are not provided.
This paper studies microgrid resiliency considering in particular the case when they are affected by tropical cyclones to provide a practical context and consider the presence of diverse sources, storage, interfaces, and the distribution architecture. One of the merits of this paper is that it initially provides a definition of resiliency and establishes a quantifiable approach to it. It additionally considers the integration of lifelines with microgrids and their planning, operation, and control. The complementary behavior of source diversity and energy storage is also demonstrated in this paper via the developed DER models. This paper also develops the methodology of fitness functions that are used to measure the time-dependent microgrid resiliency for various microgrid architectures. The next section discusses microgrid components, including DERs, interfaces, main grid and loads, and the models for interface resiliency. In Section III, resiliency models for microgrid DERs connected to interfaces are discussed. In Section IV, the distribution architecture is included and the microgrid resiliency formulas for radial, ring, and ladder architectures are given. Section V discusses the numerical results for the effects of interfaces, storage, and the distribution architecture resiliencies in islanded mode. The overall grid-tied microgrid power supply resiliency under the influence of tropical cyclones is also calculated.
II. MICROGRID COMPONENTS
Microgrids are defined as [1] "locally confined and independently controlled electric power grids in which a distribution network with a given architecture integrates DERs with the loads." A schematic of a microgrid is shown in Fig. 2 . Microgrid components can be broadly classified into four categories: 1) sources; 2) loads; 3) storage; and 4) interfaces. The sources in a microgrid include the main grid, microturbines, gas generators, diesel generators, and renewable energy sources like PV modules and wind turbines. The loads are, however, dependent on the specific application under which the microgrid is employed, such as hospitals, military bases, ships, remote communities, telecommunication systems, and campuses. Energy storage includes batteries, fuel tanks, compressed air, and flywheel and ultracapacitors. Interfaces are power electronic interfaces and protective equipment, such as circuit breakers (CBs).
Power electronic interfaces, as depicted in Fig. 2 , form the nexus between all components in the microgrid. Therefore, from a system perspective, the electricity flow in a microgrid is contingent on the proper functioning of the power electronic interfaces. The up time of a microgrid is considered to be the time when the microgrid is able to serve the loads from the DERs. 
A. Behavior of Microgrid Components Influencing Resiliency

1) Sources and Loads:
Variation in the source's power output, caused by a number of reasons, is one of the major factors affecting power supply resiliency. Sources, such as generators, depend on lifelines such as pipes and transportation networks. These lifelines' performance affects the fuels delivery to the generator that in turn makes the power available from generator variable. In the case of renewable energy sources, natural phenomena make their power supply variable [30] .
2) Storage: Energy storage is used to address the source's output variation. Energy storage state is therefore probabilistically evolving impacting the microgrid resiliency as it is explicitly indicated in (2) . Other effects affecting the energy storage performance are battery degradation over time and leakages [10] . Degradation ultimately reduces the capability to tolerate long outages, thereby impacting microgrid resiliency.
3) Interfaces: Interfaces form a crucial component within a microgrid. They form the nexus between all microgrid components. The microgrid distribution system is ultimately realized via the interconnections of interfaces. These interfaces can be either CBs or power electronic interfaces. The choice of using conventional CBs versus power electronic interfaces from a resiliency perspective is important when considering the overall microgrid performance.
As mentioned before, while CBs are used as protection equipment, power electronic interfaces can be used for both controlling the power flow and protection. These interfaces and the conductors connecting them are also subject to failures and repairs. It is also assumed that interface failures are independent of each other. In most circumstances, the availability of these components is very high-in the range of 5 to 6 nines [8] , [31] - [33] ; however, they can impact the overall microgrid performance and their contribution to microgrid resiliency has to be understood. Hence, the CB and power electronic resiliencies are discussed below.
Consider first a CB that is modeled as the combination of the CB itself and its protected conductor. Failure modes for the CBs with conductor considered here are: 1) the failure to open when a fault occurs (this failure is characterized by the failure to open probability ρ); 2) short-circuit failures of the CB or its protected conductor; and 3) open-circuit failure of the breaker. However, if a breaker opens due to a fault elsewhere in the microgrid, it is not considered as a failure because the CB is fulfilling its function of isolating a fault. Resilience of the CB/protected conductor pair is calculated using a Markov model whose state transition diagram is shown in Fig. 3 . The availability of the CB with the conductor in series is calculated as the probability of being in state 00 (which is the state where both the conductor and the breaker are in a working condition) in the state transition diagram of Fig. 3 . The corresponding state transition rate matrix is given in the following equation [34] , in which the rows correspond to transition out of states 11, 10, 01, and 00, respectively:
Typical specifications for highly resilient CBs [31] , [33] show the failure rates λ B and λ C and the repairs rates μ B and μ C for the conductor and the CBs as follows: λ B and λ C take values of 3.19 × 100 −7 h −1 . The failure rates for components can be obtained based on the manufacturer specifications and design guidelines; however, the repair rates associated with the breaker are dependent on the application, maintenance policies, and the available logistics. The typical values for μ B and μ C are on the order of 0.001 h −1 . The failure to open probability can be considered to be on the order of ρ = 0.01. Using these values in (3) , an availability on the order of 6 nines is achieved for the CB.
In comparison, there are many reasons favoring the use of power electronic interfaces within microgrids. Design needs usually favor dc over ac architectures. For example, statistically dc microgrids have a higher availability over ac microgrids [8] , thus suggesting that dc microgrids are more resilient than ac microgrids. Power electronic interfaces also have the added advantage of being capable of having builtin redundancy. Power electronic interfaces can be arranged in an n + 1 redundant or, in general, in an n + m redundant configuration. Examples of such various redundant topological converter configurations with sources clusters, namely, "D" and "E" from [8] , are shown in Fig. 4 (a) and (b). From [31] , the component failure rates in power electronic systems are 0.79 × 100 −7 h −1 for the MOSFET, 0.27 × 100 −7 h −1 for the diode, 0.60 × 100 −7 h −1 for the capacitor, and 1.13 × 100 −100 h −1 for the inductor. If the CB system is to be compared with the power electronic interface system, for the same repair rate, the power electronic system would have higher availability due to the possibility of adding redundancy and relatively low failure rates of components. Higher up times of power electronic circuits occur because circuit elements, such as MOSFETs and inductors, have failure rates on the order of 100 −8 to 100 −100 , whereas the CB system has failure rates on the order of 100 −7 . Power electronic interfaces may also be integrated with additional energy storage in a single unit, such as in so-called active power distribution nodes (APDNs) [33] . A simplified APDN schematic from [33] is given in Fig. 5 . The additional energy storage increases the uptime of the resource to which the APDN is connected. Thereby, APDNs can be used to integrate sources and loads by increasing up times due to the integrated energy storage. Still, such an advantage is dependent on APDN location. Consider for example, in a microgrid with diverse sources, an APDN failure connected to a load will result in a larger impact compared with one connected closer to a source. This situation is partly because the inclusion of multiple sources could provide additional support to the load, but a load interface failure will lead to loss of such a load. As it will be shown in Section V via the derivation of resiliency formulas for each microgrid architecture, load interfaces failures play an important role in determining the overall resiliency calculations.
In the remainder of this paper, power electronic interfaces are referred to as interfaces. For the rest of the microgrid components, in this paper, the analysis for the dynamics is done in discrete time intervals with each interval indexed by the variable t.
B. Resiliency Calculation for a Single-Source Storage and Load Power Supply System
The up time of a microgrid, as mentioned before, is modeled as the time when it is able to serve the load demand by the microgrid DERs. The down time is the rest of the time considered for measuring resiliency. Then, resiliency metrics follow from (1) and (2) . The ability to serve load is represented via a fitness function G [t] , as shown in (4) . The fitness function quantifies the total difference between the supply and storage and the load demand. It is explained using the following example. Consider a basic setup wherein a source is powering a load supported by an energy storage unit. Let X[t] be the energy supplied by the source in interval t. If the time interval length is T , then the average power supplied by the source is 
where, as indicated, G is a surplus energy for the time interval t when G > 0 and deficiency when G < 0. The fitness function G[t] for each time interval evaluates the ability of the power sources and energy storage devices to provide energy to the load. In addition, another way of interpreting the fitness function is the total excess energy during a time interval t of a connected microgrid. Mathematically, it is expressed as follows.
and f L [t] are the probability distributions of X[t], B[t], and L[t] at time t, respectively, then resiliency R[t] is
That is, resiliency R[t] equals the probability of
, which are to be derived for the given type of source and load. The next section discusses the microgrid DERs modeling. Also note that the fitness function shown in (4) does not consider the behavior of interfaces. In the next section, the behavior of the sources and energy storage devices when considering the interfaces is also developed.
III. MICROGRID DERS MODELS WITH POWER ELECTRONIC INTERFACES
In this paper, three sources are considered to be present in the microgrid: the main grid, diesel generators, and PV modules. The probabilistic behavior of the power output of each of these sources needs to be calculated first. Each source may include its own associated energy storage device with storage state changes that depends in part on the load seen at the terminals of the source/storage unit. In the next steps, the models for the source and energy storage devices while considering the effects of the interface are derived.
A. Source and Load Characteristics With Interface
Let X be the source output and let 0 A be an indicator random variable such that the interface is in a working state. The indicator function 0 A takes the value 0 when the interface is in a working state and the value 1 when the interface is in Fig. 6 . State transition diagram for the evolution of the grid during a tropical cyclone at which the chain occurs with probability p f . a failed state. The power output at the interface terminal is, therefore,X = (1 − 0 A )X. Let f A and f X be the probability mass functions (pmfs) of the interface and the source, respectively. The interface pmf is a Bernoulli distribution, which indicates the probability of being in either one of the working or failed states. The source pmf f X is completely general, there are no mathematical restrictions, except that it has to be a probability distribution function, giving the probability of the source output X. The source pmf is usually derived via modeling the statistical behavior of the physical phenomena in the case of the renewable energy sources and lifeline in the case of diesel generators. The pmf ofX denoted by fX is given by the following formula:
The equivalent formula for the load with interfaces is also employing the above formula in (6) . Evidently, from (6), the resiliency of the distributed resource X is bounded above by the interface resiliency.
B. Model of the Main Power Grid
During extreme events, such as tropical cyclones, the grid availability or resilience can be modeled using a Markov chain represented by the state transition diagram in Fig. 6 . The states indicated by "A" correspond to grid-ON and in the presence of a hurricane. The states denoted by "B" correspond to grid-OFF and in the presence of the hurricane, states marked with "C" indicate grid-OFF with hurricane absent, and states indicated with "D" represent the grid-ON (and no hurricane). The transitions from state A to B, from state B to C, and state C to D are governed by the probability distributions of the failure time T f , wait time T w , and repair time T r , respectively. The number of states in A, B, and C is also dependent on the probability distributions of T f , T w , and T r , respectively. The number of states in each set A, B, and C is equal to the maximum number of time steps that each event, namely, failure, wait, and repair, respectively, takes to occur.
The Markov chain transitions into one of these states starting from state A0 in each time step according to the state transition diagram ultimately ending in state D. Therefore, each set of states A, B, and C has additional states indexed by integers that account for the time spent in each state A, B, and C. These additional states within each set of states A, B, and C are virtual states and are necessary because the probability of making a transition from states A to B depends on the amount of time spent in A. Subsequently, the amount of time spent in state B dictates the transition probabilities to state C and similarly from states C to D. On the other hand, if each of the set of states A, B, and C was represented as single state, then the resulting stochastic process would not be a Markov chain, it would, instead, be a semi-Markov chain [34] . The Markov chain representation simplifies the analysis and loses no information about the underlying process compared with the semi-Markov chain [34] . The Markov chain described is predicated on the occurrence of a grid outage caused by a tropical cyclone.
Let the grid outage probability be p f . The probability of the grid being "ON" given that an outage will occur with probability p f is the probability of being Fig. 6 under the assumption that the natural disaster (e.g., a hurricane) has a given intensity is [34] 
where
is the vector representing the probability of being at each corresponding state in Fig. 6 at time t and P grid is the transition probability matrix for the Markov chain in Fig. 6 . The grid resiliency function versus time is found with the initial conditions that the grid was in a working condition. This function is
Therefore, R grid is the grid resiliency as seen by the microgrid at the grid tie, including the grid-tie interface resiliency R I grid .
The numerical values for the failure, wait, and repair times were obtained using outage data observed for major hurricanes from 2005 to 2008 covering the states Texas, Louisiana, and Florida [35] . Typical values used in the calculations are given in Table I . The grid outage probability given a tropical cyclone intensity can be calculated using [35] 
where V is the maximum wind speed, T is the exposure time under at least tropical storm conditions, H is the storm surge height, and A is the total area of land exposed to at least tropical storm winds [35] . Typically, it can be assumed that the capacity of the grid is infinite; i.e., if there is a grid, then any and all of the load demand may be supported by it as long as there is a path to the load from the grid-tie point via the microgrid distribution network. This simplifies the grid resiliency modeling when analyzing the microgrid resiliency. This assumption simplifies the analysis because of two reasons, the grid states as seen by the microgrid can be modeled as a binary random variable and additionally making the grid-tie resiliency independent of the amount of load installed at the site. That is, the formula of (8) can be directly be used in the microgrid resiliency calculations. This assumption allows the calculation of a best case resiliency for the microgrid's grid tie.
C. Renewable Energy Sources With Embedded Energy Storage in Their Interfaces
The model for the energy storage devices and PV sources is derived from the work in [10] and extended to include the interface. The energy storage device dynamics without interfaces is given by the following equation [10] : The above process is represented by a Markov chain similar to the one in [10] . The state transition diagram of such a Markov chain is shown in Fig. 7 . Note that in the fitness function calculation in (4), the energy storage element is mathematically treated like a source. Then, the battery output via its interface is given byB[t] = (1 − 0 A B )B[t] . Consequently, the pmf ofB, denoted by fB , is calculated using (6) . The probabilistic evolution in the battery state of charge is governed by the transition probability matrix P batt whose entries are indicated in the state transition diagram of Fig. 7 π
D. Diesel Generators With Interface
A diesel generator can supply power only if there is sufficient fuel being supplied to the generator via some mechanism whether it is a pipeline or a fuel tank. That is, diesel generators depend on a fuel delivery-supply system for generating power. The fuel delivery-supply system has two components, the fuel delivery system, which delivers fuel to the generator's location, and the fuel supply to the generator from the tank present at the location. This fuel delivery is indicated to be present by the presence of a flow through point A in Fig. 8 and the fuel supply is indicated to be present by the presence of flow via point B in Fig. 8 . In extreme conditions, the fuel delivery to the diesel generator is discontinuous, that is, the flow in point A is intermittent due to delays in the transportation of fuel. Therefore, the fuel delivery process switches between two states, the refueling state S RF and the nonrefueling state S NRF , as shown in Fig. 9(a) . The fuel supply discontinuity is mitigated by the presence of fuel storage, but the tank needs to be refueled by a refueling system usually composed of trucks, as shown in Fig. 8 . However, there is a lead time or delay associated with each refueling instance from the time when it is requested, which makes the fuel delivery discontinuous. The fuel consumption dynamics are described as follows at each time step t: 
where F[t] is the fuel consumed corresponding to the load. The load served by the generator is given by
Thus, the resulting generator fitness function is
whereZ [t] is the generator-with-interface output. The dynamics of (13) describing the fuel tank state evolution is represented with a Markov chain whose state transition diagram is shown in Fig. 9(b) . The downward transitions in this state transition diagram are governed be the variation in the load demand. The probability of D [t] occurring is the refueling probability. The refueling probability is defined as the probability that a refueling event occurs and the fuel tank is filled. The refueling probability is denoted by b in the state transition diagram for the fuel tank Markov chain in Fig. 9(b) . A simple way of calculating the refueling probability b is shown below. Let the fuel delivery process be modeled as a two-state process, as shown in Fig. 9(a) , wherein the refueling event lasts for one time step, which corresponds to instantaneous refueling. Therefore, the refueling probability is [34] 
where T S RF and T S NRF are the time spent in refueling and notrefueling states, respectively. In this paper, it is assumed that the fuel truck arrival time T S NRF is governed by a triangular probability density function. The triangular probability density function is characterized by its minimum time T i such that the probability density in [0, T i ] is zero. T i signifies the minimum time that is required to place an order and the fuel truck to travel to the site to deliver the fuel. T m is the parameter that indicates the time before a fuel delivery is guaranteed to take place and T D is the maximum likelihood point or the fuel delivery due time. For a triangular density function, such as the one used in [1] , it can be shown that
The fuel level pmf is given by f F and the diesel generator output pmf is given by fF calculated using (6) . The probability of the diesel tank fuel level is given by
The fuel level probability distribution and, subsequently, the generator power output pmf f Z [t] can be calculated using (13)- (19) . When the diesel generator is working along with a renewable energy source in the microgrid, it is assumed that the generator is called into action only when the PV and the batteries are insufficient to serve the load. This reduces the expenditures in fuel and reduces the number fuel deliveries required over a given time period.
IV. MICROGRID ARCHITECTURES
Microgrids are generally connected using one of the following three architectures: 1) radial; 2) ring; or 3) ladder [27] . This section derives resiliency formulas for the microgrid for Radial microgrid: three loads, one PV, three batteries, three generators, and one grid tie. each of the microgrid distribution architectures. The use of the fitness functions used to model the DERs resiliency are extended to derive the overall microgrid resiliency formula. In this section, for ease of notation, the time variable is suppressed and it is to be understood that all resiliency equations derived in this section are functions of time.
A. Radial Microgrid
Consider a simple radial architecture in Fig. 10 . Due to its simplicity, radial architecture is one of the most popular architectures used for microgrid power distribution [36] . In this configuration, the loads receive power only if the interfaces at the load are all working, that is to say, having the load interfaces operating is a necessary condition for microgrid operation, albeit not a sufficient one. A failure in a source interface would not necessarily result in a loss of service due to the presence of other sources and energy storage units. Therefore, the radial configuration's fitness function is the sum of the interfaced sources' outputs and storage minus the load under the condition that all load interfaces are working. Let r i be the i th interfaces' resilience and W IL the state where all the load interfaces are working. Mathematically, the resilience of a radial power distribution is given by
where R IL is the probability that all the load interfaces are working as indicated by
and R G is the microgrid resiliency under the conditions that the load interfaces are working. R G is calculated as the probability the fitness function is nonnegative indicating that the load is being served. The resiliency R G with the interfaces is found by convolving the pmf under the assumption that the demand and supply are independent
and fX is the pmf ofX , which is the sum of the interfaced sources' output. As mentioned before, in the microgrid, it is assumed that the generator is called into action only when the PV and the batteries are insufficient to serve the load. That is, the diesel generator is used only to serve the part of the load that cannot be served by the PV and the battery. Therefore, the load seen by the generator is
The diesel generator output pmf is calculated using the generator models (13)- (19) . When the fitness function is calculated, all similar sources are lumped: the diesel generators are lumped together, the PVs are lumped together, and the loads are lumped together. In the above formula for the radial microgrid, resiliency is calculated in island mode, i.e., without the grid being explicitly expressed, the grid resiliency is incorporated as follows. It was mentioned in the grid model section that this paper makes the assumption that, if present, the grid is capable of supporting all the load. During a grid failure, when the microgrid is in island mode, the microgrid resiliency is the first term of the summation in (25) multiplied by the probability that the grid is disconnected. When the grid is connected, any deficiency from any of the DERs can be compensated by the grid whose probability is given by the second term in (25) . Therefore, the grid's presence is sufficient to power the load, and therefore, the total microgrid resiliency in the combined grid-tied and island mode is
B. Ring Microgrid
Consider the ring microgrid in Fig. 11 . As in the radial case, the loads receive power only if the interfaces at the load are all working. Let r I i be the interface resilience at the i th load. Let X l be the set of sources for the left leg of the ring and X r the set of sources for the right leg of the ring. The set of all sources is represented by X x . Similarly, letL l , L r , and L x be the set of loads for the left leg, the right leg, and all loads, respectively. The two legs of the ring are connected to each other via the bus interfaces, e 1 and e 2 . If either one of these interfaces are working, then each load can be served by each source. Therefore, under this assumed configuration, when either of the bus interfaces are working, the distribution network architecture is similar to the radial network, i.e., the DERs and loads are all connected to each other. When both e 1 and e 2 are failed, then the left and right legs of the ring get separated and the fitness function for each leg has to be calculated. The left leg and right leg fitness functions are denoted by G l and G r , respectively, and, the connected ring fitness function is denoted by G x . The fitness functions formulas for G x , G l , and G r are shown after developing the ring microgrid formulas in terms of the fitness functions as they are similar to the radial microgrid. The ring resiliency formula is then derived as follows. Note that in the following equations, the subscript x denotes variables associated with the connected ring. The subscripts l and r denote the variables associated with the left and right legs of the ring, respectively. The ring microgrid resiliency is calculated under the four possible conditions of the bus interfaces: 00, 01, 10, and 11, in which the first digit indicates the condition of the e 1 interface and the second digit represents the condition for the e 2 interface. In the first three states, at least one of the bus interfaces is working corresponding to the first term of the summation in (26) , and the second term in the summation of (26) corresponds to the case when the legs of the ring are separated, i.e., state "11." In each case, the probability of the fitness function being nonnegative is calculated by
where 0 W IL X is the state corresponding to all the load interfaces working and 0 W IB = 0 is the state indicating that atleast one bus interface is working. The probability of both bus interfaces being OFF is U IB = u e 1 u e 2 and the probability of either one being ON is R IB = 1 − U IB = 1 − u e 1 u e 2 . Then, after substituting the equations for the bus interface's resiliency, the following form of the ring microgrid resiliency is obtained:
In each of the terms of (26) and (27) , the load interface resiliency is multiplied, because a working load interface is a necessary condition for the loads to receive power. The total load interface resiliency is the product of the load interface resiliencies, as shown in
The load interface resiliency for the left leg and right legs are
Also note that R IL x = R IL r R IL l . Therefore, after simplifying the ring microgrid resiliency formula in (27) using (28) and (29), the following form is obtained:
Next, the ring microgrid fitness functions are described. Using the radial microgrid formula, the fitness function for the connected ring is
The above fitness function represents the total excess energy within the connected ring microgrid. In this condition of the microgrid, the DERs and loads are all connected to each other and the microgrid may share each resource as necessary. Yet, when the bus interfaces separate the two legs, each leg operates independently of the other. Mathematically, however, the fitness function is identical as in the case of the connected ring microgrid. Thus, the fitness functions for the left and right legs are
The fitness functions G l and G r represent the total energy in each leg taken separately. An important observation is that the connected microgrids total excess can be found using the individual leg fitness functions. That is (33) which means that that once f G l and f G r are known, f G x can be evaluated as
The above concept of breaking down the microgrid into smaller sections and calculating the individual fitness functions could in future be extended to more complicated configurations such as mesh architectures.
The resiliency formula for the ring microgrid in terms of the connected and left and right leg resiliencies is explained next. Let R x = Pr(G x ≥ 0)R l = Pr(G l ≥ 0)R r = Pr(G r ≥ 0), then the ring microgrid resiliency formula is
From a design perspective, the fitness functions G r and G l could also be used to balance the amount of DERs and loads across each leg of the ring by comparing their pmfs.
C. Ladder Microgrid
The ladder microgrid resiliency calculation is also similar to that of the radial microgrid. The basic schematic is given in Fig. 12 . Consider the interfaces connecting the DERs and loads to the buses, as shown in Fig. 12 . In order for the load to be served or the DERs to remain connected to the rest of the system, at least one of the interfaces on the leg needs to work. Thus, for the purpose of resiliency calculations, the two interfaces can be replaced by a single interface with a resiliency corresponding to an equivalent condition that at least one interface is working. Let r a and r b be the resiliency of the two interfaces. The resiliency of the equivalent interface r e is r e = 1 − (1 − r a )(1 − r b ) .
Replacing the interfaces on each leg of the ladder by their equivalent interface, with a single bus in the distribution, the 
where R IL are the equivalent interface resiliencies and the set of working states W IL are such that the equivalent interfaces are working.
The next section discusses the results of resiliency calculation for each of the microgrid architectures in islanded mode and the effects of storage and interfaces in islanded mode. The results with the grid tie are presented for the radial architecture to illustrate the time-dependent power supply resiliency during the various phases of the tropical cyclone.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The equations derived in the previous section are all time dependent. However, the underlying phenomena and events driving the variation of the output each of the sources can occur at different time scales, and therefore, changes in probability over time of one DER might be different from another. In addition, the load variation is dependent on the application. It is important to note these changes in order to better design and plan the microgrid resources. Changes in the input PV insolation can occur within seconds to minutes due to clouds along with the day and night variation [10] . The fuel delivery cycles can be on the order of hours to days, and the grid failure and restoration activities occur in days to weeks. Therefore, the changes in probabilities versus time between the two systems can be vastly different. In the case during extreme events like natural disasters, tropical cyclones, and earthquakes, where the fuel delivery can take up to a week [2] and the number of refueling cycles might be only a few and in some extreme cases, only one refueling cycle might have elapsed [2] before the restoration activities of the main grid are complete. This makes the time dependent resiliency formulas derived in this paper necessary for the analysis. During tropical cyclones and earthquakes, grid outages can last for days or weeks, while the diesel generators, PV sources, and loads evolve in much smaller time scales by comparison. Typical failure time, wait time, and repair time parameters for the grid are given for a triangular probability density function in Table I . These are discretized and used in the formulas for calculating the grid resiliency. Hurricane intensity in this paper is calculated using the formula from [35] , which is
where V is the maximum wind speed, T is the exposure time under at least tropical storm conditions, H is the storm surge height, and A is the total land area exposed to at least tropical storm winds [35] . The value chosen for hurricane intensity is L = 6.4. Hurricane intensity of 6.4 has been observed in areas such as Suffolk County in New York during Superstorm Sandy [35] . The resulting grid outage probability for L = 6.4 is p f = 0.75 calculated using (9) . The corresponding, T f , T w , and T r parameters are given in Table I . The grid outage probability p f is interpreted as the initial islanding probability. That is the probability that when a hurricane event occurs the microgrid will switch to island mode due to a grid outage. The fuel delivery arrivals are calculated using triangular probability density functions whose parameters values and the refueling probabilities are given in Table I . The insolation data used in the calculations were collected in Austin, Texas, from 7 A.M. to 7 P.M. for 7 months from [10] . A typical 250-W PV panel from [37] with 15.3% efficiency and an area of 1.51 m 2 are used for the calculations. The PV array constructed has the mean output of 1.05 kW and a peak rated capacity of 10 kW. The interfaces are assumed to have a resiliency of 6 nines [33] . The load L is assumed to be a binomial random variable with a mean of 3.5 kW and a maximum of 7 kW and a battery size choice of 10 and 20 kWh.
Using the above data for the microgrid DERs, the resiliencies for the three architectures are calculated for various configurations of sources, interfaces, energy storage, and loads and the results are compared. The individual calculations for each DER model are not shown here due to space constraints. The DER results presented in this paper can be reproduced by constructing the matrices P grid , P batt , and P tank using the state transition diagrams shown in Figs. 6, 7, and 9 and the data given in this section of this paper. For the radial configuration, in the absence of the grid, the resiliency of the PV with a battery of capacity 10 kWh for load L is 0.81598 and the same PV system with a battery of capacity 20 kWh for load L is 0.96991. With the introduction of a diesel generator with a tank capacity 40 kWh and a refueling probability 0.081, the resiliency improves to 0.9985 for the battery size of 10 kWh and to 0.999994 or 5.2218 nines for the battery capacity 20 kWh. It is seen that even for very low fuel delivery probability, there is a significant improvement in resiliency by adding a generator with a fuel tank, i.e., energy storage. A plot of resiliency versus tank capacity is shown for a battery of 20 kWh in the same system in Fig. 13. Fig. 13 reveals an important aspect of fuel storage on the microgrid resiliency. Fuel storage is locally stored energy that allows reducing dependency on roads (a microgrid lifeline) and improves resiliency. In this discussed case study, the resiliency improvement is due to the addition of a 40-kWh fuel storage, which approximately triples the energy storage with respect to the 10 kWh from the batteries and approximately doubles the energy stored in the 20-kWh batteries. This energy storage increase considers that the diesel generator operates at 40% efficiency [38] (including fuel conversion and electricity generation). The amount of additional fuel storage installed in the microgrid improves its resiliency by 3 nines (from 0.81598 to 0.9985) for the 10-kWh battery microgrid and by 4 nines (from 0.96991 to 0.999994) for the 20-kWh battery microgrid. This improvement is also caused in part by the addition of source diversity. Doubling the battery capacity of the installed PV from 10 to 20 kWh produced a change of 1 nine. This example demonstrates the importance of including source diversity along with added storage in order to achieve greater improvements in resiliency.
The same set of DERs and loads used in the radial microgrid are used in the calculations for the ring microgrid. However, there are number of choices with respect to where each DER or load might be connected in the ring microgrid. If all DERs and loads are connected to the same bus, then the resiliency is equal to that of a radial architecture, as it is evident from (27) . The worst case or the case with the lowest resiliency is when all the DERs are on one bus and all the loads are on the other bus, which yields a resiliency of 5.2217 nines. The first choice of connection is no different from a radial microgrid, which means that the advantage of protection offered by the ring architecture by spatially distributing the DERs and loads is not used. In the second case, the loads are farthest away from the DERs, which results in the connection of bus interfaces in series with load interfaces reducing the resiliency. Better resiliency may be achieved in a ring microgrid where the loads and DERs are spread among both the buses of the ring. For a given set of DERs and loads, each may be placed at different locations in the ring microgrid based on various criteria. One of these criteria could be balancing the fitness function G r and G l so as to achieve an equitable distribution of resources and loads in the microgrid so that loads are equally served trading off versus overall resiliency.
The ladder network equations are exactly the same as those for the radial network when the interfaces on each leg are replaced by their equivalent radial interface. The presence of the additional interfaces improves the total interface resiliency in each leg of the ladder network. For the interfaces considered here, the left and right legs interface have r a = r b = 6 nines. The equivalent interface resiliency r e from (35) yields 12 nines, which improves the effective interface resiliency by six orders of magnitude. In order to study the impact of such an improvement, now consider a microgrid with the same components as the radial microgrid in the previous example but connected in a ladder configuration. For the same set of DERs and loads, i.e., with battery of 20 kWh and with tank capacity 40 kWh, the resiliency is 0.9999954 or 5.337 nines. The corresponding radial network has a resiliency of 0.999994. At first glance, the improvement in resiliency appears small in the ladder microgrid. However, the ladder network resiliency is extremely close to the maximum resiliency achievable by the microgrid with the only limitation caused by the performance of the DERs. In the ladder configuration, the interfaces in the microgrid are essentially performing at a resiliency of 1. Any further improvement in the microgrid resilience can be obtained by only improving the performance of the DERs. The improvement provided by the ladder network can be illustrated by the following example. Consider a source supplying a load via an interface. If the source resiliency is 0.999995 (5.301 nines) and the interface resiliency is 0.999999 (6 nines), the effective resiliency of this system is 0.999994 (5.22 nines). However, when the source is connected to the load via a ladder architecture with two interfaces, the resiliency increases to 0.99999499999 (5.301 nines). These calculations elucidate that the ladder interfaces connected essentially in a 1 + 1 redundancy is not only highly resilient but also brings the microgrid to its maximum resiliency (which is still limited by the performance of the DERs) removing any limitations posed by the failure of interfaces. This simple example explains the impact of interface resiliency on the overall system resiliency.
The different values help distinguish between the various quantities being referred to. Power electronic interfaces always have a higher resilience than those of DERs, especially in extreme conditions when source resiliency is affected by lifeline performance. It is crucial that power electronic interfaces perform extremely well so as to achieve the overall resiliency of the series connection of the source and the interface as close to the source resiliency. Comparing the ladder with the ring architecture using the equivalent radial model, it is observed that the ladder resiliency is far greater than that of the ring microgrid resiliency.
An important observation derived from the equations for each of the architectures is that the microgrid resiliency is dependent on the load interface resiliency. That is, the connection points form a single point of failure in providing a connection to the load. Though highly resilient interfaces are desirable, the sensitivity of the microgrid resilience diminishes as the interface resilience grows. Therefore, while improving the microgrid resilience, aspects such as source diversity and sufficient energy storage as well as highly resilient interfaces should be considered.
The same set of sources and load are used for radial, ring, and ladder architectures when comparing their resiliencies. It was observed, as expected, that the ladder has greater resiliency than the ring and radial. The comparison was done using an islanded microgrid with the PV, a 20-kWh battery, Table II . The comparison of the ring and radial networks can be performed as follows. For this particular example, the radial was more resilient than the ring network. This apparently counterintuitive result can be understood simplifying the ring resiliency formula given in (34) into (38) as follows:
If the microgrid is employing a radial architecture, the resulting equation is
which is the first term in (38) . Therefore, in order for the ring microgrid to be more resilient than the radial, that is,
That is to say, the ring microgrid has higher resiliency than the radial network if and only if R l R r > R x . Conversely, the radial architecture is better than the ring under condition that R l R r < R x . When expressed in terms of the fitness functions (40) is written as
From (33) Pr(
The condition expressed in (42) is dependent on the probability distribution of individual fitness functions G l and G r . Therefore, the ring architecture may or may not be better than radial depending on the ring network construction. Due to space limitations, in this paper, it was preferred to prioritize the example of the counterintuitive case in which a ring power distribution architecture does not yield a resiliency better than a radial power distribution architecture over the commonly considered case of ring architectures performing better than radial architectures, in order to explicitly demonstrate that microgrids are not necessarily resilient systems and that not all microgrid designs yield the expected resiliency improvement. That is, microgrids can provide improvements in resiliency but only with adequate designs. This example also shows the importance of measuring resiliency as done in this paper and does not merely consider qualitative approaches under the intuitive belief that a given design will necessarily yield a resilient power supply. Therefore, the DER, interface, and load placement in a microgrid is very important in terms of achieving highly resilient microgrids. The microgrid resiliency formulas reveal that the microgrid resiliency is bounded above by the term R IL , which is the product of the resiliency of the load interfaces when the load is more dispersed (more load units) for the same total load power consumption the overall resiliency reduces due to the reduction in value of R IL . On the other hand, however, grouping the loads at a single interface leads to increasing the single point of failures within the microgrid system at the load interface. Hence, in order to obtain better design of a highly resilient system, choices need to be made in how to configure the placement of the load within the microgrid distribution. For example, a reduction in the number of interfaces in the path between a source and a load could reduce the number of single points of failures caused by the series connection of interfaces. Another method could be to increase the number of paths from the sources and loads, for example, mesh networks. Third, increase storage integrated interfaces closer to loads so as to protect against failures in the distribution architecture occurring closer to the sources.
The above calculations have been so far limited to considering the grid's absence. Next, the radial microgrid resiliency including the grid is calculated. The microgrid includes the PV, generator, and load before with the addition of the grid tie. First, consider the grid tie alone. As mentioned before, the grid failure probability was found to 0.75 for the chosen hurricane intensity of 6.4 according to (11) and (37) . The time varying grid resiliency for the chosen hurricane intensity is shown in Fig. 14. Fig. 14 shows that the probability of having the grid-on at various times during the event can drop as low as 0.25 during the hurricane event. The resiliency function shown in Fig. 14 is interpreted as follows: in the initial stages, the grid is under storm conditions and failures due to damages begin to occur at various sections of the bulk power grid. The probability of obtaining power from the grid sharply decays to 0.25 as outage caused by the hurricane intensify while reaching peak outages. The probability is lowest during this time. The resiliency function grows back toward being 1 albeit at a slower rate compared with the rate of failing owing to the receding storm conditions and the start of restoration activities. 15 shows, for the same hurricane intensity of 6.4, the grid-tied microgrid resiliency. The same description as that of Fig. 14 applies, however, the resiliency drops to no less than 4 nines. The resiliency function of Fig. 15 demonstrates the significant improvement of power supply resiliency thanks to the DERs of the microgrid over time for the load as the grid resiliency returns to normal operating conditions. The microgrid performance can be better tuned to respond to extreme events if better statistics of the failure, wait, and repair times of the grid were collected in order to plan microgrid resources for such events.
The presented example in the case studies is typical of the gulf coast and the east coast of the U.S. By observing at the time-dependent resiliency function of the main grid in Fig. 14 , the microgrid resources may be better planned to address the lack of power from the main grid. Fig. 15 shows a worse case improvement of power supply resiliency from 0.25 to 4 nines. The next step in such a design scheme is to predict the extreme event conditions from the microgrid's perspective. The model in (37) connects the grid outage to the hurricane conditions there by providing one of the first steps in predicting the operating conditions (i.e., in advance of a given hurricane). Likewise, it is possible to use the proposed analysis to plan and design a microgrid considering various scenarios for disasters that could affect the area where the microgrid will be located.
VI. CONCLUSION This paper discusses microgrid modeling for quantifying microgrid resiliency under the effects of extreme events. In order to evaluate resiliency, the behavior of DERs and their associated lifelines have to be accurately modeled while considering their operating conditions, which is one of the major contributions of this paper. In addition, this paper presents the following novel aspects: a quantifiable approach to resiliency, modeling individual DER's resiliency considering lifelines dependencies, interfaces and energy storage devices and developed a fitness function methodology to systematically evaluate DERs' resiliency powering loads using interfaces, which is used to derive the resiliency formulas for three-microgrid distribution architectures. Integrated characterization of the effect of power electronic interfaces on microgrid resiliency is conducted. The resiliency models are developed for extreme events such as natural disasters and examples of how resiliency can be improved in a typical event is shown in the case studies using historical data.
The analysis shows that well designed microgrids can improve resiliency. Fitness functions (representing total excess energy in the microgrid) were used to quantify the DERs and microgrid architecture resiliencies, considering individually each DER's dynamics. The microgrid power grid-tie model was developed using an absorbing Markov chain, which describes the grid-tie state from the start of the disruptive event to the end of restoration activities. The fitness functions methodology was also used to study power distribution architectures including the effect of using power electronic circuits. Comparing the power distribution architectures revealed that inclusion of additional interfaces improves only slightly the resilience observed in the ladder architecture, which is the topology showing the highest resiliency among those studied. Resiliency improvement is driven simultaneously by diversity, energy storage, and highly resilient interfaces. The presented example comparing radial and ring architectures explicitly demonstrates that microgrids are not necessarily resilient systems and that not all microgrid designs yield the expected resiliency improvement. The architecture analysis also revealed the importance of measuring resiliency using the methods presented in this paper over qualitative approaches under the intuitive belief that a given design will necessarily yield a resilient power supply. In addition, the analysis quantitatively shows that significant improvements in microgrid resiliency require the use of diverse power sources and the integration of meaningful levels of energy storage. Considering these design improvements, this paper shows that for the hurricane intensity considered, the power supply resiliency can be improved from 0.25 with microgrid absent to 0.9999 with a properly designed microgrid-with diverse power sources, energy storage, and power electronic interfaces used in an adequate power distribution architecture-present.
